US and Musharraf Friends With Benefits

If reports about the ongoing discussions between President Musharraf and the former prime minister Benazir Bhutto are accurate, then Musharraf may soon cease to be a general and Bhutto may take up her old job: this is one step forward and two steps back for constitutional government in Pakistan.

No doubt there's a strong argument that the president of a country should not also be the commander in chief (though the framers of the US constitution disagreed). So the deal will fix that anomaly. But, in return, to allow Bhutto to have a third term as prime minister, the constitution will be amended and all corruption charges against her will be dropped.

It is difficult to see how this is a positive development for the rule of law in Pakistan. However, constitutional exception-making, frankly, is commonplace in Pakistan's history. And this is not the worst element of the deal. The practical consequences for democracy, economic growth, peace with India and the struggle against extremism will be much more serious.

It may seem odd to say that ending military leadership is bad for democracy. However, the advantage of having the general-as-president is that he is less dependent on traditional party politics. That model of politics is tribal and feudal, whereby power is transmitted from the people to political leaders through major landowners, industrialists and imams. The great hope that Musharraf manifested for a while, when he first came to power, was that he was going to wreck this structure. His move to create councils at a local level, guaranteeing representation for women and minorities, empowering a new generation of grassroots leaders, was a critical first step in doing so. His deal with Bhutto, if concluded, will signal that this new politics has failed and it is difficult to see Bhutto, whose base of major supporters is relishing the prospect of returning to power, having the political chutzpah to resurrect it.

Equally, Bhutto's return to power is a risk to the economy. As Musharraf documented in his recent book, In the Line of Fire, Pakistan's economy stagnated under Bhutto during the 1990s, levels of poverty rose and massive sums of money mysteriously disappeared from public accounts. Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan's current prime minister, a technocrat, who formerly was a high-ranking executive at Citibank, has overseen a remarkable turnaround in the economy that has delivered a double-digit growth rate and a large boost in Pakistan's foreign currency reserves.

Finally, there are the security issues. Throughout Pakistan's history, the relationship with India has been tense. But Musharraf has handled it with care, and has outlined a possible settlement over Kashmir. He has been able to do this because he is the army chief. A civilian leader like Bhutto will find it much more difficult to continue or accelerate the development of friendly relations with India. This is partly because the bellicose elements in the military and intelligence services will be released from the yoke of their commanding officer but also because hostility towards India is popular in Pakistani politics - this isn't Bhutto's fault but she may not be able to resist the temptation to play to the gallery.

She will face a similar political logic over combating extremism. Pakistan is not a militantly religious country - there are strong streams of heterodox religious practice and a powerful drift is underway towards western cultural values. But, even though most people do not agree with the extremists, they are intensely uncomfortable with seeing the police or armed forces attack religious schools or mosques, where extremists may be based. Musharraf has been able to pursue this cause, to a limited extent, because of the uniform; Bhutto will not be able to continue it with even the same vigour, let alone enhance it.

In the end, this deal is not only crooked, it is a setback for anyone who wants a liberal and democratic future for Pakistan.

By Kamran Nazeer

Don’t “Cut and Run,” but Please “Don’t Stay the Course” Either

Does the death of at least 250 Iraqi civilians, the deadliest single incident of the war, coming four years into the fighting and seven months after the surge was announced, actually signal progress for the U.S. strategy in Iraq?

It does.

Listen to the military commanders, spokesmen, and academics and you’ll learn that the attack is intended to distract Congress and the American public from the progress being made in Baghdad and elsewhere, and that it is a kind of "last gasp" for al-Qaeda in Iraq.

And they’re right!

Here’s the story, on Tuesday August 14, 2007 multiple car and truck bombs were detonated in two remote northwestern villages in Iraq, killing at least 250 civilians and obliterating blocks of houses. The attacks had all of the signatures of al-Qaeda and of the Sunni dominated al-Qaeda in Iraq affiliate, which evidently selected the isolated villages of Qataniyah and Jazeera near the Syrian border because they were the home to ethnic Kurd Yazidis, a pre-Islamic people who have lived in this region since ancient times.

Here’s the back story, Despite such isolation, tensions among the Yazidis, Muslim Kurds and Arab groups in northern Iraq have led to increasingly violent incidents. In April, a 17-year-old Yazidi girl was stoned to death after she eloped with a Sunni Muslim man and converted to Islam. Cellphone video footage of her death, called an "honor killing" by other Yazidis, was broadcast widely on the Internet, setting off a wave of attacks against the group. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/)

While, the attacks Tuesday and Wednesday appear to be part of a larger pattern of increasing violence in regions with relatively little military protection; the U.S. military has cited major successes, such as increased cooperation with tribal sheiks in Anbar province and a drop in the number of sectarian killings in Baghdad, following the addition of 30,000 troops this year. But the number of civilian deaths from mass-casualty bombings was nearly three times higher in July than in June, mostly as a result of incidents in the north.

Could this instance be a microcosm of what would happen if the US had a successive troop withdraw? And what then about a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawals?

Nevertheless, setting a rigid, Washington-driven timetable is an option, but a bad one. A precipitous troop reduction could have far-reaching effects: emboldening Iran, weakening U.S. security promises to friendly states, and even sparking military initiatives by other powers — Turkey or Iran — to deal with the resulting security vacuum. Our weakened position in Iraq also could undercut our leverage in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

What about imposing a tripartite division of Iraq? That would merely feed ethnic cleansing and likely lead to a wider, more intense conflict.

The right approach is a coordinated diplomatic, legal, economic and security campaign drawing upon broader dialogue in the region and intensified political work inside Iraq.

A permanent Gulf regional security dialogue could emerge that includes Syria and Iran, and the United States could undertake a role as regional security guarantor. Preliminary discussions should lead to a more intensive dialogue with Iran in which security assurances and nuclear programs are discussed.

In terms of diplomacy, our team would engage each state and party, solicit its views and challenge it to participate in moving forward, just as U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke did in the Balkans a decade ago. Next steps might include confidence-building measures, hosted discussions between factions, and perhaps one or more larger meetings to conclude firm commitments, timetables or sequence of events.

Of course there are no guarantees, but from such a dialogue should emerge a prescription for U.S. troop levels and activities consistent with our larger interests. Carrots and sticks could be employed. For instance, the factions could vow certain actions in return for U.S. assistance or troop deployments, or redeployments, and possible assistance from neighboring states.

Reaching an understanding on Iraq need not be a lengthy process, but the dialogue must be broadened in scope and participation to be effective. The aim would be a consensual solution underwritten by outside guarantors, not an imposed solution. And finally, military power would have a subordinated and supporting role.

Simultaneously, the United States would set about transforming its applied military power in Iraq into the useful diplomatic influence essential to addressing broader security concerns.

Ultimately, security in the Gulf and winning against al-Qaeda will require that we work with regional powers, promote stability and gradual transformation, and regain "strategic consent" for long-term U.S. assistance in the region. We must use the situation in Iraq to propel us toward this larger goal, and in doing so, we will also find the right way to wind down our deployment there.

The outline of what needs to be done is clear. But does the administration have the courage and foresight to do it, or will it continue to march into profound failure?

This is a geopolitical development of the first importance. It is a clear statement that, the United States is firmly intends to maintain help stabilize control of Iraq. Now is the time for the United States to researt its authority in a new global age. The US needs to refocus is military might from a Cold War mentality to a geo-regional political defense. The US already has 890 military installations in foreign countries, ranging from major Air Force bases to smaller installations, say a radar facility. A base in Iraq would enable the Pentagon to close a few of those facilities and focus on new geographical spheres of influence. As part of a post-cold-war shift in its global posture, the Defense Department should close several (but not all) of it installations in Europe and reopen new military installations in the Asia, Southeast Asia (specifically India), Asia Minor, and the Middle East.

I believe that there is a bridge between us that can be built towards a better future, and we shouldn't think that this bridge will be built by violence. It must be built with dialogue and mutual respect. I have great respect for the Arab culture, and almost every Arab I know has great respect for the United States in many different forms. Sometimes it's not necessarily positive politically, but it's positive in other ways —in our educational system, for example. But this gap that exists between us-- if we are to defeat the people that will do things like Osama Bin Laden, crashing the airplanes into the World Trade Center, or Zarqawi, who would have killed thousands of Jordanians-- thousands of Jordanians, if his plan had been pulled off. We must move together. It can't be America versus the Arabs. It must be Americans and Arabs, Muslims and Christians working against the people that have no vision for the future other than hate. And if we can't do that, then we will suffer just like the people of Abu Ghreib and just like the poor American who was beheaded at the hands of the terrorists.