Will Turkey Be On the Table For The EU in Time for Thanksgiving?

In its 17 December 2004 decision, the European Council recognised Turkey’s “significant legislative progress in many areas” but added that “these need to be further consolidated and broadened”. Furthermore, the report also took note of the improvements in the country’s economic stability and predictability and the strengthened independence and efficiency of the judiciary. Regarding the respect for human rights and the exercise of fundamental freedoms, “Turkey has acceded to most relevant international and European conventions”.

Most importantly for Ankara, Turkey got a fixed date (3 October 2005) for starting membership negotiations. The Turkish side had originally hoped for an earlier date, in view of the Copenhagen summit commitment that the EU would open talks "without delay" once Turkey is deemed to have made sufficient progress in its reforms.

Under the Council’s decision, a framework for Turkey’s EU membership negotiations was established by the Commission. This document was released on 29 June. The negotiating framework, which has been described by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn as "rigorous", rests on the following elements:

• The underlying and shared objective of the talks will be Turkey’s accession. However, the negotiations will be “open-ended”, which means that their outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand.

• At the end of the talks, should Turkey fail to qualify in full for all obligations of EU membership as specified in the Copenhagen criteria, EU member states would still ensure that Ankara is “fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond”.

• The accession negotiations will be conducted in the framework of an Intergovernmental Conference with the participation of Turkey and all EU member states. The policy issues will be broken down into 35 policy areas (chapters) - more than ever before - and the decisions will require unanimity.

• The EU may consider the inclusion of long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses in its proposals for each framework.

• Membership talks with candidates “whose accession could have substantial financial consequences” (such as Turkey) can only be concluded after 2014, the scheduled date for the establishment of the EU’s new financial framework.

• Accession negotiations can be suspended in case of a “serious and persistent breach […] of the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded”. Suspension would require a Commission initiative or a request to that effect by one third of the member states. The final decision would be made by the Council by qualified majority, and the European Parliament would be informed.

• Under a compromise formula agreed at the December 2004 EU Council, before 3 October 2005 Turkey would have to sign a protocol that will adapt the 1963 Ankara Treaty to the ten new member states of the EU, including the Greek Cypriot government. For practical purposes this would amount to an implicit recognition of this government for the first time since the island’s division in 1974. “The adoption of this protocol is in no way recognition, and I’ve put this on the record,” Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said. The deal did not include a commitment from Ankara that the protocol would be ratified by the Turkish parliament before October 2005. As for the other key condition: Turkey on 1 June 2005 enacted the country's revised penal code.

Throughout Europe, the arguments that surround Turkey's projected accession revolve around a series of issues, ranging from demographic through geographic to political. One commonly raised point is that, if and when it were to join the EU, Turkey would become the EU's most populated member state. Turkey's current population is 71 million, and demographers project it to increase to 80-85 million in the next 20 years. This compares with the largest current EU member state Germany, which has 83 million people today, but whose population is projected to decrease to around 80 million by 2020.

Another argument is rooted in the age-old debate on whether it is possible to establish geographic borders for Europe, and whether Turkey 'fits' within these borders. This is seen by many as a dispute that rests on philosophical and intellectual prejudgements, especially since the Treaty of Rome is widely accepted to aim for the construction of a union of European states based on shared common values.

Perhaps the most sensitive of all arguments centre on the cultural and religious differences. Since the EU identifies itself as a cultural and religious mosaic that recognises and respects diversity, the supporters of Turkey's EU bid believe that, as long as both Turkey and the EU member states maintain this common vision, cultural and religious differences should be irrelevant.

The EU member states' concerns over Turkey's human rights record as well as global and regional security-related issues have also been key factors behind Turkey's prolonged application process.

The future of the divided island of Cyprus has also been a major sticking point. The Council's December 2004 decision entailed a compromise formula on the Cyprus issue, under which the affected sides were expected to work towards a solution to the conflict before the scheduled 3 October 2005 launch of membership talks with Ankara, however conflict still remains unresolved. Cyprus is a decisive factor in the negotiation process. Cyprus demands official recognition by Turkey and access to Turkish harbours and airports. Turkey demands putting and end to the isolation of Northern Cyprus and emphasises that it was the Greek side of the island that rejected the UN’s plan in 2004.

The results of the referenda on the EU Constitution during the first half of 2005 - especially the No votes in France and the Netherlands - have been detrimental to Turkey's EU bid. Although subsequent research and surveys have failed to prove that enlargement in general, and Turkey's candidancy in particular, were key factors behind the public's rejection of the Constitution, the summer of 2005 still witnessed an increase Europe-wide of scepticism towards Turkey's European prospects.

Turkey needs to make further progress in the area of freedom of speech. More specifically the EU would like to see a reform of Turkey's penal code and the controversial article 301, which serves as a basis for the so-called "Turkishness-cases" against writers and journalists.

With Turkish parliamentary elections this August and domestic support for an EU membership in decline, the issues seem to be increasingly difficult to resolve. Turkey’s public is more and more tired of the negotiation process. A recent Eurobarometer showed that only 44% of Turks thought EU membership would be a good thing, compared to 66% in spring 2005. A survey by the German Marshall Fund of the US, published in June, confirmed this tendency. Turkish politicians are increasingly making use of this sentiment, especially with a view to the upcoming elections. An expression of this is the criticism expressed by Turkey's public concerning Pope Benedict's comments on Islam on 15 September 2006.

The Council of Europe (CoE) also welcomed the election of Abdullah Gül, with CoE Parliamentary Assembly President René van der Linden describing him as "a modern reformer". He also counts on the new president "to spread the European spirit in Turkey".